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This paper examines the eects of European Commission's (EC) new leniency program on the EC's
capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is
studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in
antitrust policies and economic conditions might aect cartel duration. Comparative statics results
are then corroborated with empirical estimates of hazard functions adjusted to account for both the
heterogeneity of cartels and the time-varying policy impacts suggested by theory. Contrary to earlier
studies, my statistical tests are consistent with the theoretic predictions that following an ecacious
leniency program, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short run and falls in the
long run. The results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other
forms of conspiracy. Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D43, K21, K42, L13.
Keywords: evaluation of antitrust policies, leniency, time-varying policy eects, missing observations,
sample selection bias.
1. Introduction
Illegal cartels often enjoy long lives, even in jurisdictions where they are targeted for intensive
investigation and harsh punishment. Cartels discovered by the European Commission (hereafter
\EC") for the years 1985-2011 lasted, on average, more than eight years. International cartels
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of the 90s sampled by Levenstein and Suslow (2011) take, on average, eight years to break up.
Similar statistics have been reported by a number of recent studies.1 The duration of cartels
is believed to depend on features of the cartel's self-policing mechanisms, such as information
exchange and compensation (Levenstein and Suslow 2011; Zimmerman and Connor 2005), and
those of market conditions, such as the volume and volatility of demand (Dick 1996; Suslow
2005) or the number of buyers (Dick 1996; Zimmerman and Connor 2005). Less well understood
is whether antitrust policies can have an inuence on cartel duration, and how to empirically
evaluate the ecacy of the policies.2 Questions about the policies' ecacy are inherently
dicult to address because of the potential sample selection bias from only observing the
detected cartels (Levenstein and Suslow 2006; Harrington 2006b, 2008; Harrington and Chang
2009; Miller 2009; Brenner 2009) and the ambiguity regarding the long-run inuences of policy
intervention (Harrington and Chang 2009; Brenner 2009). But the analysis can shed light on the
evaluation and design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the EC's new leniency program. The program
commits the EC to the lenient treatment of early cartel confessors. In particular, it grants
complete immunity from nes to the rst participant in a cartel to inform the EC of the cartel,
provided that an investigation into the alleged cartel has not already started. It also oers
discretionary ne reductions to conspirators that denounce the cartel when an investigation
is already underway. The key question addressed here is how to assess the deterrent eect
of such a program on the population of cartels when information from undiscovered cartels
is not available. This is worthwhile because, on the one hand, such programs have become
increasingly popular instruments for destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels in
many jurisdictions around the world (OECD 2002, 2003) and have enjoyed proven success in
the U.S. (Miller 2009); On the other hand, a burgeoning empirical literature (Brenner 2009; De
2010) is ambiguous about the ecacy of the EC's leniency. Because the EU and US leniency
programs are similar in some important respects but dierent in others,3 conclusion about the
performance of the former may not be drawn directly from that of the latter.
I structure the empirical analysis by adapting Harrington and Chang's (2009) model of
dynamic cartel formation and dissolution where an industry of rms interact repeatedly over
1An excellent survey of this literature can be found in Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
2The exception is Miller (2009).
3For example, cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in the E.U., whereas in the U.S. they are excluded.
Another related issue is that the U.S. has a plea bargain system that the E.U. lacks where it is possible for
cartel participants to receive ne reductions through a plea agreement instead of leniency application.
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an innite time horizon. Absent antitrust intervention, there is a \marginal industry" in which
rms are indierent between collusion and competing because the short-run gain of cheating
for each rm equals its long-run benet from colluding. An ecacious antitrust innovation
works its eect by increasing a rm's short-run benet from cheating to a level that exceeds its
long-run gains from colluding. In this way, the policy-innovation moves the \marginal type"
from a population of sustainable, longer-lived cartels to a population of unstable, shorter-lived
ones. The model generates intuitive predictions that can be used to assess the ecacy of
antitrust innovations (such as the leniency program): The impact of an ecacious policy on
the duration of discovered cartels is time-dependent. In particular, following an increase in the
detection capabilities of an antitrust authority, the marginal cartels immediately break up and
the ensuing cartel discovery comes from a population of longer-lasting cartels. Because of such
a sample selection eect, the average duration of discovered cartels increases in the short-run;
In the long run, the duration decreases due to the enhanced overall deterrence.
The theoretical model is taken to 126 discovered cartels from the EC for the period December
18, 1985 to December 2011. The introduction of the new leniency program on February 19,
2002, provides an exogenous shock that identies the impact of leniency on the duration of
discovered cartels. Since that date, the grant of immunity has become automatic and the
door of leniency applications has opened to late confessors. It is in these ways that the EC's
new policy closely mimicked the US leniency. Therefore, I supplement the EC data with a
comparable data set of cartel discoveries from the US Department of Justice (DOJ 1985-2005).
Together, these data sets provide a basis for assessing the dierence between cartel duration
under the existing EC leniency regime and that absent the regime.
Reduced form, semiparametric hazard models are used and compared to alternative ap-
proaches. The models test whether cartel durations increase immediately following leniency
introduction (consistent with enhanced detection) and whether durations subsequently fall be-
low short-run levels (consistent with enhanced deterrence). Unlike earlier studies, my approach
allows for a clear-cut separation of the short-run and the long-run impacts of leniency. I am
able to control for economic conditions, cartel's self-enforcing mechanisms, and other factors
that may inuence cartel durations. By way of preview, the time series of cartel durations is
consistent with the notion that the introduction of the new leniency program enhanced the
detection and deterrence capabilities of the EC. The duration of discovered cartels increases
immediately following the introduction of the leniency. The changes are statistically signicant,
large in magnitude, and robust to various specication and sample choices. The results indicate
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that the new leniency program may have the intended eects and lend credence to the EC's
new policy.
The existing empirical literature of cartel duration has generally been based on a restrictive
assumption: The eects of antitrust policies on cartel duration do not vary from the short run to
the long run. A single duration elasticity was estimated where the short- and long-run impacts
of changes in the policy environment on the hazard function| the conditional probability of
cartel dissolution| are not isolated. This assumption will be relaxed here. The assumption
is unsatisfactory because: rst, that it precludes an analysis of the pattern of policy impact
over time; and second that it gives rise to potentially biased estimates of the policy impact by
confounding the short-term and the long-term eects. As Harrington and Chang and Miller
(2009) have shown, the long-term impact on cartel stability of a policy-innovation may dier
quantitatively and qualitatively from the short-term impact.4 An implication of this result is
that no sensible inference can be drawn about a policy's ecacy without rst separating the
short-term from the long-term impacts.
Both Brenner (2009) and De (2010) empirically evaluate the impacts of the EC leniency pro-
grams and test Harrington and Chang's theory. The main dierence between their approaches
and mine is in the treatment of the short-run and long-run impacts.5 De does not dierentiate
the short-run from the long-run impacts. Brenner takes the rst three years of the leniency
program's existence as the short run (Brenner 2009, p. 643), despite lack of theoretical support
for choosing any particular time length. I dierentiate the impacts by cartel start date: In line
with Harrington and Chang, the short-run impact arises only with cartels that started before
leniency introduction; the long-run impact arises only with cartels born after the introduction.
I directly derive a functional form for the hazard from Harrington and Chang's model. I then
estimate this hazard function using semiparametric estimation techniques that are adjusted to
account for the time-varying policy eects suggested by the theory. In contrast with Bren-
ner's and De's where no supportive evidence for the theory was found,6 my empirical analysis
4See Harrington and Chang (2009), p. 1416 and Miller (2009), pp. 756, 760-62.
5Brenner (2009) and De (2010) do provide verbal discussions on the ambiguity of the long-run policy eects
that are suggested by Harrington and Chang. But neither author has produced a formal analysis in this
direction.
6Without producing an analysis that distinguishes the short-term from the long-term policy impacts, De
claims that Harrington and Chang's theoretical predictions are not supported by the data (De 2010, p. 60).
Brenner (2009) particularly states that his analysis restricts to testing the \short-term predictions" of Harrington
and Chang's theory because the long-run predictions are ambiguous (see Brenner 2009, p. 641).
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demonstrates the theory's ability to reproduce many basic features of the data.
Additionally, the regression samples in Brenner and De are essentially single time series
with one or two exogenous policy changes (the EC's 96 and 02 leniency programs). In contrast,
I use both the EC and the DOJ data for which similar leniency programs are in place. Cross
sectional variation as such may provide more robust identication (Miller 2007, 2009).
My analysis is subject to at least two important limitations, and the results should be inter-
preted with caution. The rst limitation is that there are too few observations to yield reliable
estimates about the long-run impact of the EC's 2002 leniency. To obtain reliable estimates,
one needs an adequately number of cartels that are born after the leniency introduction. Only
ve EC cartels formed following the introduction. To remedy the problem, I supplement the
EC data with the DOJ data. A suciently large number (40) of DOJ detected cartels formed
in the period postdating the DOJ's policy innovation, admitting an analysis of the long-run
impact; The second limitation is that the theoretical model requires one to draw inferences
about the population of cartels using information from discovered cartels. The inferences are
valid so long as the discovered cartels are characteristically representative. In the theoretical
model, I assume that all cartels are detected with the same probability. In practice, however,
the antitrust authority may focuses its resources towards dealing with cartel cases that surfaced
through its leniency program.
My empirical results on the impacts of the EC leniency echo those of Miller (2009) and
Levenstein and Suslow (2011), who study the impacts of the DOJ's amnesty. Miller species
and explores an exogenous stochastic process of cartels though cartel formation and dissolu-
tion are not endogenized as in the present paper.7 Miller's results are consistent with those
presented here because they suggest that guaranteed immunity for rst-in leniency applicants
is an important element for ecacious leniency. Levenstein and Suslow report descriptive
statistics of international cartels that support Harrington and Chang's predictions about the
amnesty's short-run impact though these predictions are not tested formally as in the current
paper (Levenstein and Suslow 2011, p. 469). Other related empirical work includes that of
Jacquemin et al. (1981), Marquez (1994), Dick (1996), Suslow (2005) and Zimmerman and
Connor (2005) which documents the eects on cartel longevity of macroeconomic uctuations,
market conditions and other cartel characteristics.
My results may have important policy implications. Cartels harm consumer welfare and
impede market eciency. Although most jurisdictions around the world treat hardcore cartels
7Harrington and Chang (2009) made the same remark on Miller's (2009) model in relation to their theory.
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as \[t]he most serious ... violations of competition law" (OECD 2002b), the data analyzed here
indicate that the EC detected hardcore cartels in more than 50 distinct industries across four
continents over the sample period. The size of collusive overcharges is large: Boyer and Kotchoni
(2011), for instance, estimate a median overcharge of over 13 percent, based on a meta-analysis
of more than 1000 cartels; Using a survey of 674 hard-core cartels, Connor (2010) calculates a
median overcharge of 25 percent.
Although the discussion to follow focuses primarily on cartel oenses, it demonstrates an
empirical approach to the study of anti-crime policies that might be of broader interest. Cartels
and other forms of crimes such as terrorism, narcotics violations, large-scale fraud, kidnapping,
sexual violence and arms and human tracking share in common an important characteristics:
the oenders hide their activities and the victims do not always report. One observes therefore
only discovered crimes. Analyzing the impact of a policy on the criminal activity is dicult
because discovered crimes might be a small and characteristically unrepresentative sample of
the population of crimes. Exploring the potentially time-varying pattern in average duration
of observed crimes following a policy introduction should permit productive analysis of many
anti-crime policies heretofore considered dicult.
The second section of the paper considers the theoretical foundation for empirical hazard
models of the cartel formation and dissolution process. The implications of the model are
explored empirically in the remaining sections. My sample of discovered cartels nds that the
duration of collusion consistently reects the determinants suggested by theory. Concluding
remarks and possible extensions follow.
2. Theory
2.1. Industrial Behavior
My starting point is Harrington and Chang's (2009) dynamic model of cartel formation and
dissolution, within the framework of which I provide two slightly stronger results than Harring-
ton and Chang (Theorems 7 and 8). My results, unlike Harrington and Chang's, can be directly
corroborated in an empirical model of cartel durations. There is a population of oligopolistic in-
dustries. Time is discrete and N identical rms play an innitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
in each industry. In each period, there is a stochastic realization of a market's protability
that is summarized by . Each rm earns  if they collude; if not, they compete and each rm
earns . Without loss of generality, I normalize  to 0. A cartel participant earns  (with
 > 1) by unilaterally deviating from a collusive arrangement, where  represents the value of
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deviation.  is drawn from a distribution F with support [; ] and positive continuous density
f . At the beginning of each period,  is observed by the rms prior to deciding how to behave.
 is given by a distribution G with support [; ] and positive continuous density g. The rms
discount time at the same rate; their discount factor is  where 0 <  < 1.
At the beginning of each period, industries are either cartelized or not. Industries that were
cartelized at the end of the previous period are currently cartelized; Industries that were not
cartelized at the end of the previous period have an opportunity to do so with probability p
(with 0 < p < 1). If a cartel collapses at the end of a period { either due to self-defect or an
antitrust intervention { then with probability p the industry has an opportunity to re-cartelize
in the next period. Let y0 denote the present value of a rm's payo when an industry is
cartelized. An antitrust policy is a pair of parameters h; i, where  2 (0; 1) is the probability
that the antitrust authority detects and penalizes a cartel at the end of each period. The
(present value of) total amount of nes that a cartel participant pays is y0, where  > 0 is
the ne multiplier. Let s(t; ; ) denote the steady-state share of cartels with a duration of t
periods in a type- industry under policy , where t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g; t = 0 means that industry
 is not cartelized; 1 Pt 1t^=0 s(t^; ; ) is the share that survive for at least t periods.8
2.2. The Hazard Rate of Cartel Dissolution
Now I derive theoretical predictions that can be tested empirically. They relate to the probabil-
ity that a cartel survives for t periods conditional on the event that the cartel survives for at least
t periods, i.e., the dissolution hazard of discovered cartels. An antitrust innovation, such as a
leniency program, aects the hazard over time. I model an antitrust innovation as an exogenous
change in the detection rate from 1 to 2 (with 2 > 1). The steady-state dissolution hazard
of discovered cartels in industry  prior to the innovation is given by h(t; 1; ) =
s(t;1; )
1 Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; )
,
where t 2 f1; 2; :::g. The average steady-state dissolution hazard of discovered cartels prior to
the innovation is given by:
~h(t;1) =
R
1
s(t; 1; )f()d
1  R
1
Pt 1
t^=0 s(t^;1; )f()d
; t 2 f1; 2; :::g; (1)
where 1 is the set of industries in which collusion can be sustained prior to the innovation.
Rearranging (1), we have that ~h(t; 1) =
R
1

h(t; 1; ) (1 
Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; ))f()R
1
(1 
Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; ))f()d

d: ~h(t;1)
8For detailed derivations and formulations of the stead-state shares, see Harrington and Chang (2009), pp.
1409-10, and the online Appendix.
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is then the weighted average of h(t; 1; ), where the associated weight is the probability that
a cartel with a duration of at least t periods is of type .
Let 2 denote the set of industries that are capable of sustaining collusion after the innova-
tion. Due to Harrington and Chang,9 we have that, if 1 < 2, then 1  2. That is, raising
the detection rate reduces the measure of the set of industries capable of sustaining collusion.
After the innovation, formerly stable cartels in the set 1 n 2 collapse immediately and the
distribution of industries shifts from
(1 
Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; ))f()R
1
(1 
Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; ))f()d
to
(1 
Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; ))f()R
2
(1 
Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;1; ))f()d
: But in
the short run durations stay unadjusted for the remaining cartels, i.e., their dissolution hazard
is unchanged. The average dissolution hazard shifts, in the short run, from ~h(t;1) to:
~h(t;1; 2) =
Z
2
"
h(t;1; )
 
1 Pt 1t^=0 s(t^;1; ) f()R
2
 
1 Pt 1t^=0 s(t^;1; ) f()d
#
d: (2)
The transition from the short run to the new steady state involves the duration of the sur-
viving cartels adjusting in each industry: The industry-level hazard shifts from h(t;1; ) to
h(t;2; ) =
s(t;2; )
1 Pt 1
t^=0
s(t^;2; )
. As a result, the average hazard readjusts, in the long run, to
~h(t;2) =
Z
2
"
h(t;2; )
 
1 Pt 1t^=0 s(t^; 2; ) f()R
2
 
1 Pt 1t^=0 s(t^; 2; ) f()d
#
d:
We now arrive at the main results of the theoretical model:
Result 1 (Short-Run Eect of Raising Detection Rate). If 1 < 2, then ~h(t;1) 
~h(t;1; 2) for all t 2 f1; 2; :::g. That is, an increase in the detection rate leads to an immediate
fall in the average dissolution hazard of discovered cartels after an innovation.
Result 2 (Long-Run Eect of Raising Detection Rate). If 1 < 2, then ~h(t;1; 2) 
~h(t;2) for all t 2 f1; 2; :::g. That is, after the immediate fall in the average hazard of discovered
cartels following an increase in the detection rate, the hazard readjusts above the short-run levels.
Proofs are postponed to the online Appendix. But it is worth sketching the intuition here,
because the comparative statics of this model are fairly intuitive and could result quite reason-
ably from a variety of dynamic models of cartel behavior. Result 1 of the theoretical model has
the empirical analogue that an immediate increase in the duration of discovered cartels follow-
ing the introduction of a more ecacious leniency program (captured by an increase in ) is
consistent with enhanced detection capabilities. This is because marginal cartels immediately
9See Harrington and Chang (2009), p. 1409.
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break up, and that the ensuing cartel discovery comes from a population of longer-lasting car-
tels; Result 2 has the empirical analogue that following the initial increase in cartel durations,
a subsequent readjustment below short-run levels is consistent with improved deterrence capa-
bilities. This is because, on one hand, the marginal cartels that are prone to quick dissolution
would not form in the rst place, entailing a rise in the average cartel durations observed; On
the other hand, the formerly stable, long-lasting cartels dissolve earlier, leading to a decline in
observed durations. In the long run, the latter eect eventually overcomes and dominates the
former.
3. Data
Data for this study are taken from the complete set of published EC cartel decisions between
December 18, 1985 to December 7, 2011. The EC data are supplemented with a comparable
cartel discoveries data set from the US DOJ (1985-2005). The analysis relies primarily on
the EC data because, rst they are more comprehensive; and second, and more importantly,
unlike in the DOJ data where cartel durations may be a part of an agreement reached in a
plea-bargaining process (Miller 2009), durations in the EC data are more cleanly observed.
The EC data include 139 cartels decided by the EC, the Court of First Instance (CFI) and
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A rich variety of case-specic information is recorded in
the data, including the start and end dates of a conspiracy, the aected product markets, and
the level of nes.10 These are the key variables of interest in this paper. In order to isolate
the eect of leniency from those of the other institutional changes, my analysis restricts to 126
cartels that dissolved before the publication of the White Paper on Damage Actions (April 2,
2008) | a major innovation in the EU's anti-cartel regime.11 I refer to the 126 cartels as my
complete EU sample. A subsample of cartels | 106 cartels| of the complete EU sample are
formed absent a leniency. They are referred as the pre-leniency EU sample.
Besides the problem of inadequate observations for estimating the long-run impact of le-
niency, the EC data suers from a lack of reliable information on producer concentration. The
variable has been shown to be an important determinant of cartel stability (Selten 1973) and
10Unless otherwise specied, all euro values throughout the paper are adjusted to 2010 e using standard
measure of general price trends published by the OECD on the Producer Price Indices for prices, labor costs
and interest rates of domestic manufacturing.
11The White Paper \suggests specic policy options and measures that would help giving all victims of EU
antitrust infringements access to eective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated for the
harm they suered". See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html for details.
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the eects of leniency (Ellis and Wilson 2003). Omission of this variable could well bias some of
the estimated eects of leniency and those of other predictors in my empirical analysis. In some
cases, the EC reports market shares of cartel participants near the end of an infringement. How-
ever, using the information (e.g., De 2010) may give rise to endogeneity problems:12 Existing
market shares may be results of cartel activities in deterring entries (Harrington 1989; Leven-
stein and Suslow 2011). Therefore, market concentration may increase as a cartel advances;
Alternatively, the market shares of a cartel may decrease over the duration of an infringement if
collusive prots attract more (non-conspiring) entrants into the market in question than would
be in a more competitive environment (Sutton 1991, 1998; Symeonidis 2002; and Levenstein
and Suslow 2010). Furthermore, apart from the US and Germany, data on concentration ratios
and other summary measures of market structure are largely unavailable in ocial publications
(Lyons et al. 2001, McCloughan and Abounoori 2003). Collecting data and constructing my
own concentration ratios for each cartelized market are an enormous, if not impossible, task
and are beyond the scope of the present analysis. But to remedy at least in part the poten-
tial model misspecication bias, I include the total number of participating cartelists during a
cartel's entire course to control for, among other things, dierence in producer concentration
across the cartelized markets. Given that the sampled cartels usually capture the majority, if
not all, of all the market shares, the number of cartel members may serve as a (imperfect but
reasonable) proxy for the number of market competitors. In addition, although old participants
may exit and new rms may join force in mid of an infringement, the total number of partici-
pated rms is invariant to a cartel's duration. Moreover, EU-wide and worldwide markets are
likely to have more competitors than national markets; Some industry types (e.g., mining) are
likely to feature higher concentration than others (e.g., wholesale and retail trade) for reasons
such as existence of entry and exit barriers (Mann 1966; Martin 1979). Therefore, I include
the scope of the geographic markets (as determined by the EC in its decision) and the type of
industries as additional controls for concentration.
Cartel duration. The variables and model parameters are dened in Table 1, and the cor-
responding descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Besides reporting proven start dates of agreements, the EC sometimes reports suspected st-
12Information on the market shares of the cartel participants at the beginning of an infringement in the EC
data are largely missing. Moreover, the EC generally distinguishes market share in sales volume and in sales
value in its report.
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Table 1. Terms and Definitions
Denition
Cartel An agreement or a series of agreements between competing rms or associations of rms
that constitutes a single infringement, according to the EC, of Art. 101 (formerly
Art. 81 and Art. 85) of the EC treaty.
Start date The start date of the rst agreement between any two (or more) participants of a cartel.
End date The ending date of the last agreement(s) between any two (or more) cartel partici-
pants that is reported in the EC's last published decision on the cartel. For cartels
that continued at least until the date of the EC's last published decision (hereafter
\decision date") and whose ending dates are (therefore) unpublished, it is set as the
decision date.a
Dependent Variables
DURATION The number of months between a cartel's start and end dates that is proven by docu-
mented evidence.
DURATION-2 The greater of [1] the number of months elapsed between a cartel's start and end dates
that is suspected by the EC but without documented evidence; and [2] DURATION.
Antitrust Policies
LENIENCY-SR 0 if a cartel ends before July 18, 1996; 1 if it ends after July 18, 1996, but before
February 19, 2002; 2 if it ends after February 19, 2002.
LENIENCY-LR 0 if a cartel formed before a leniency program; 1 otherwise.
FINES The average corporate cartel nes per infringement issued by the EC during the pre-
vious scal year.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Firm Impatience and Industry Concentration
INTEREST Annual average (real) short-term interest rates, 3-month maturity. If the relevant
geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple countries, it is
the weighted average of the rates. The weight applied is the annual national GDP.
 GDP Annual growth rate of the real domestic product of the relevant geographic market
(according to the EC). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple eco-
nomic areas in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the rates. The weight
applied is the annual national GDP.
PEAK-TROUGH 1 if a cartel ended during a peak-to-trough period of a business cycle; 0 otherwise.
If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple
countries, it is the weighted average of the indicators. The weight applied is the
annual national GDP.
POS-SHOCK Positive deviation of real annual GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott
lter). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in
multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the deviations. The weight applied
(continued overleaf )
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Table 1. (Continued)
Denition
is the annual national GDP.
NEG-SHOCK Negative deviation of real annual GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott
lter). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in
multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the deviations. The weight applied
is the annual national GDP.
FIRMS The total number of competitors in a cartel during its entire course.
INDUSTRY TYPE Categorical variable indicating the type of industry where a cartel operates. The indus-
try types are wholesale and retail trade; food, feed, tobacco and other agricultural
products; chemicals; transport; primary material; machinery, equipment and metal
products; and other products and services.
MARKET SCOPE Categorical variable indicating the geographic scope of cartelized market. The scopes
are national, multinational (but less than EU-wide), EEA-wide or EU-wide, and
worldwide.
a. For these cartels, the EC's last published decision routinely orders the rms to refrain from the alleged agreement within a
limited time scope.
art dates without support of documented evidence. Unless stated otherwise, throughout the
paper I refer, as do Levenstein and Suslow (2011), to the start date of an agreement as its
proven start date. Moreover, rms may participate in and leave a cartel at dierent dates;
collusive agreements sometimes start in one region then spread over many regions (Levenstein
and Suslow 2011). I refer, as do the EC, the CFI and Levenstein and Suslow (2011),13 to
DURATION as the number of months elapsed from the proven start date of the rst agreement
to the end date of the last agreement between any two participants of a cartel. In robustness
checks, I obtain similar results using suspected durations.
The straightforward way to dierentiate the short-run and long-run eects of leniency, at
least as it pertains to the result of Harrington and Chang, is by using cartels' start dates: The
short-run eect arises only with cartels that formed prior to leniency introduction; while the
long-run eect arises only with cartels that formed after leniency introduction.15 Panel A of
Table 2 provides an overview for the average proven durations of the EC detected cartels by
cartel's state and end dates.
13In various judgments, the Court of First Instance made it clear that it was not necessary, particularly in
the case of a complex infringement of considerable duration, for the EC to characterize it as exclusively an
agreement or concerted practice, or to split it up into separate infringements.14
15This method is due an insightful comment of Joseph Harrington.
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Table 2. EU Cartel Duration by Start and End Dates (in months)
Panel A: Means (Standard deviations)
Cartel's Start Date
From
Before Jul-18-96 to After All
End date Jul-18-96 Feb-19-02 Feb-19-02 Start Dates Observations
Before Jul-18-96 82 (85) - - 82 (85) 53
From Jul-18-96 to Feb-19-02 101 (62) 27 (20) - 93 (64) 40
After Feb-19-02 190 (99) 47 (16) 31 (20) 118 (103) 33
All End Dates 106 (88) 42 (19) 31 (20) 95 (87)
Observations 106 15 5 126
Panel B: Medians
Cartel's Start Date
From
Before Jul-18-96 to After All
End date Jul-18-96 Feb-19-02 Feb-19-02 Start dates Observations
Before Jul-18-96 59 - - 59 53
From Jul-18-96 to Feb-19-02 77 26 - 72 40
After Feb-19-02 152 47 33 77 33
All End Dates 74 41 33 65
Observations 106 15 5 126
Source.{ Author's calculations based on 126 cartel decisions by the European Commission and judgments of the Court
of First Instance and the European Court of Justice for the period December 1985 to November 2011.
Note.{ Durations reported in this table are the number of months elapsed between the proven start date and the end
date of a cartel based on documented evidence. \Start date" refers to the start date of the rst agreement between any
two cartel participants.
Starting with the short-run eects and looking at cartels that formed prior to July 18, 1996
(column 1 of Panel A, Table 2), there is an average DURATION of 82 months for cartels that
formed then failed in the pre-leniency period; The average DURATION increased by 23 percent
following the introduction of the EC's 1996 Leniency (the average DURATION is 101 months
for cartels that formed before but failed under the old leniency program) and more than doubled
for cartels that formed absent leniency but failed under the new leniency regime.
Turning to the long-run impact of the EC's 1996 Leniency and looking at cartels that
dissolved under the policy (row 2 of Panel A, Table 2), the average DURATION decreases
from 101 months for cartels that formed absent leniency to 27 months for cartels born under
the old leniency regime. There is a similar pattern associated with the long-run impact of
the EC's 2002 Leniency (row 3 of Panel A, Table 2), where average DURATION is longer
for cartels born absent leniency than for cartels born after the new leniency introduction (the
average DURATION of cartels born under the new leniency is 31 months). Thus, evaluated
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within the framework of the theoretical model, the immediate increases in average DURATION
following the leniency introductions are consistent with enhanced detection capabilities; and the
subsequent falls in average DURATION are consistent with enhanced deterrence capabilities.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the median values that correspond to the entries in panel A.
Because of the skewed distributions of the durations, the median values are below the means
in most of the instances.
Institutional and economic environments. Three sets of explanatory variables are em-
ployed in the analysis. A rst set of variables captures aspects of the institutional environment
where cartels form and dissolve. By far, the most important is LENIENCY-SR { the variable
that indicates the antitrust regime under which a cartel dissolves. It equals zero if a cartel
dissolved before July 18, 1996, i.e., before a leniency regime was introduced in the EU; it equals
one if the cartel failed after July 18, 1996 but before February 19, 2002, i.e., the period during
which the 1996 Leniency Notice was in eect; it equals two if the cartel broke up after February
19, 2002, i.e., after the existing leniency regime replaced the 1996 regime. A second institution
variable, FINES, controls for the severity of punishment. Similar to that in Miller (2009), the
penalty variable is dened as the average corporate nes issued by the EC during the previous
scal year.16
The remaining two sets of variables have been similarly dened and used in earlier empirical
studies of cartel duration (Marquez 1994; Dick 1996; Suslow 2005; Zimmerman and Connor
2005). They reect the possible variations in the market and macroeconomic environments
where cartels operate. Some of these variables control for, at least in part, the potential
heterogeneity in dissolution probabilities across cartels.
It is perhaps by now mother's milk to the industrial economists that in a repeated-game
collusion is easier to sustain as players become more patient. The average annual interest
rate with 3-month maturity|INTEREST|is the short-term market rate of interest generally
available to borrowers. It is used as a presumptive measure of uctuations in rms' discount
factor.
Received industrial organization theory also suggests that business cycle timing may aect
cartels' stability (e.g., Green and Porter 1984; Haltiwanger and Harrington 1991; Rotemberg
16Using total corporate nes during the previous year will not alter the results signicantly. See the online
Appendix for an analysis using the total corporate nes as a proxy for severity of punishment.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Antitrust Policies; Market and Macroeconomic Conditions
Mean Std. Dev.
Antitrust Policies
LENIENCY-SR .84 .81
FINES (e mln.) 56.97 71.48
Market and Macroeconomic Conditions
INTEREST (%) 5.46 3.15
GDP (%) 2.46 1.35
PEAK-TROUGH (1=yes) .52 .47
POS-SHOCK (e bln.) 23,258.6 51,616.46
NEG-SHOCK (e bln.) 28,404.83 52,431.91
FIRMS 96.61 679.3
Observations 126
Note.{ All euro values are in 2010 e . The source for these values is author's calculations based on 126 cartel
decisions of the European Commission and judgments of the Court of First Instance and the European Court
of Justice for the period December 1985 to December 2011.
and Saloner 1986). I test for the eects of observable business cycle uctuations with two vari-
ables: [1] the real GDP growth rate ( GDP); and [2] a dummy variable| PEAK-TROUGH|
indicating whether a cartel ends in a period of peak-to-trough. I distinguish between these busi-
ness cycle measures, which are usually anticipated by the market players, and potentially unan-
ticipated demand shocks. In order to capture the latter, I estimate a nonlinear trend in (real)
GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott lter. The lter ts a smooth nonlinear trend curve to a time
series by isolating the stationary cyclical component of the time series from its non-stationary
trend component. I then calculate deviations from this nonlinear trend (POS-SHOCK and
NEG-SHOCK) and examine the impact of such deviations on cartel stability.
There are a number of ways that the size of cartel membership| FIRMS| could aect
or be associated with cartel stability. Besides reecting (inversely) concentration, it may also
inuence, among other things, the costs of monitoring and coordinating a cartel (e.g., Stigler
(1964), Dick (1996)). It is worth to note that the existence of some cartels with a large number
of rms is not as paradoxical as it may appear: many cartels with a large membership are
monitored and coordinated by a trade association.17
Finally, I include two categorical variables, INDUSTRY TYPE and MARKET-SCOPE, to
control for the eects of omitted cartel-specic characteristics (e.g., price transparency, market
17Levenstein and Suslow (2011) make a similar remark on the large number of cartel participation. Brenner
(2009) makes a similar remark on the role of trade association in monitoring and coordinating cartels.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Industry Type and Market Scope
N %
Industry Type
Wholesale & retail trade 5 3.97
Food, feed, tobacco & other agr. products 9 7.14
Primary material 15 11.9
Chemicals 40 31.75
Machinery, equipment & metal products 23 18.25
Transport 15 11.9
Other products & services 19 15.08
Market Scope
National 33 26.19
Multinational 18 14.29
EU-wide or EEA-wide 54 42.86
Worldwide 21 16.67
Observations 126
Note.{ The source for these values is author's calculations based on 126 cartel decisions of
the European Commission and judgments of the Court of First Instance and the European
Court of Justice for the period December 1985 to December 2011.
concentration, industry-specic cyclicality, etc.) that may be correlated with both dissolution
likelihood and the included variables of interest. Table 3, Panel B reports the distribution of
industry types and market scope.
4. The Empirical Framework
To analyze the inuence of competition policy and that of economic environment on the du-
ration of cartels, hazard models were estimated. My focus here is the eect of each exogenous
characteristic of the cartel on the probability of cartel dissolution, conditional on cartel not
having already collapsed, and holding other industry and institutional characteristics constant.
In what follows, I discuss two alternative empirical specications and investigate the robust-
ness of the results. The second specication is a generalization of the rst. It should be stressed
that the empirical models I am using are reduced form models and not structural models.
 Cox's (1972) semiparametric proportional hazard model is the most popular ap-
proach towards characterizing the hazard function h(t; ). The model has been used in previous
analysis of cartel durations (Zimmerman and Connor 2005; Levenstein and Suslow 2011; De
2010) and is exible enough to account for potential inappropriate distribution assumptions
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that may be involved in parametric methods.18 The hazard function for cartel i is
hi(t;xi) = h0(t) exp(x0i)
where t is the elapsed time since the start of a cartel, xi is a vector of observed explanatory
variables. The parameter vector  is the vector of coecients, measuring the inuence of
observed characteristics. The term exp(x0i) shifts the baseline hazard function h0(t), and a
positive coecient indicates that the observed characteristics increase the dissolution hazard
and reduce the cartel duration. The model is semiparametric in that the baseline hazard h0(t) is
a nonparametric function of time, with the inuence of other observable characteristics specied
assuming a particular functional form. Furthermore, the model is a proportional hazard one
since the ratio of the hazard function for any group with certain observed characteristics to
that of the baseline hazard equals a constant, dependent only on the observed characteristics;
i.e, h(t)=h0(t), the relative hazard function, is not time varying.
Suppose that there are n observations and k distinct cartel dissolution times. Further
suppose that I can rank the dissolution times such that t1 < t2 < ::: < tk where tj denotes the
dissolution time for the jth cartel. Furthermore, let Rj denote the set of cartels that have not
dissolved until time tj. Then the probability that the `th cartel will dissolve at time tj given
that some cartel in set Rj will collapse at time tj is
h`(tj;x`)P
2Rj h (tj;x )
=
exp(x0`)P
2Rj exp(x
0
)
(3)
Taking the product of the conditional probabilities in (3) yields the partial likelihood function
L =
Y
j
"
exp(x0j)P
2Rj exp(x
0
)
#
;
with corresponding log-likelihood function
lnL =
X
j
24x0j   lnX
2Rj
exp(x0)
35 : (4)
 Competing risks. A cartel can end for dierent causes: Besides \natural death" such as
defection, independent discoveries by an antitrust prosecutor can also end a cartel. Therefore,
estimation of the cartel dissolution hazard function from observed cartel duration times must
also consider the censoring of duration for cartels ending due to antitrust interventions (Leven-
stein and Suslow 2011). For such cartels, we can only infer that collusion would have exceeded
the observed cartel duration at the time of the cartel's dissolution.
18The advantages of using Cox (1972) model to analyze time to event data have been widely recognized. See,
e.g., Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980), Meyer (1990), and Perperoglou (2005).
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A popular choice towards the analysis of competition risks is using a stratied Cox model
from augmented data (Lunn and McNeil 1995). Let  denote a cartel's failure type where  = 0
indicates those cartels collapsed in a natural death;  = 1 indicates those cartels ceased by an
antitrust intervention. The joint distribution of failure times and cause of failure is considered
and the hazard function of a particular cause in the presence of all other causes is estimated. In
the absence of ties (i.e., multiple cartel groups fail at the same tj) the full partial log-likelihood
is given by
lnL =
X
j; j=0
x0j +
X
j; j=1
 
0 + x
0
j
 X
j
ln
24X
2Rj
(exp (x0) + exp (0 + x
0
))
35 ;
where 0 is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for dierent types of cartel disso-
lution dier by a constant ratio.
Running standard Cox regression on the augmented data set gives the appropriate estimates
of the regression coecients, provided the model t it good. The partial likelihood which results
from the method is precisely the partial likelihood suggested by Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980)
for competing risks.
 Testing The Time-Varying Eects of Leniency. I conduct two statistical tests. In
the rst, I examine whether the dissolution hazard of discovered cartel decreases in the short
run after the introduction of leniency. Result 1 of the theoretical model suggests that such
a decrease is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities. Recall that the short-run eect
of leniency arises only with cartels that formed prior to the leniency introduction. Therefore,
I run regressions on the sample of cartels that formed prior to July 18, 1996. Because the
regression model generates an immediate decrease in the hazard if an only if the coecient of
LENIENCY-SR is negative, I test the hypothesis:
H0 : LEN SR  0 versus H1 : LEN SR < 0;
where LEN SR denotes the coecient of LENIENCY-SR.
In the second test, I examine whether in the long run the hazard increases beyond the
short-run levels. Result 2 of the theoretical model suggests such an increase is consistent with
enhanced deterrence. Recall that the long-run eect of leniency arises only with cartels that
formed after the leniency introduction. But as already mentioned above, there is a lack of
observations on EC cartels that formed in that period. Therefore, I run regression on the time
series of DOJ detected cartels that dissolved under the DOJ's 1993 leniency| a program that
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Figure 1. Semi-Annual Average Duration of The EC's Detected Cartels
Notes: The gure plots the semi-annual average log-transformed durations of 126 cartels decided by the EC, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) between December 18, 1985 to December 7, 2011 and dissolved within
each six-month period from June 6, 1989 to October 17, 2007. The vertical bar marks the introduction of the new leniency program
on February 19, 2002.
is similar to the EC's new leniency. Because the regression model generates an immediate
increase in the dissolution hazard if and only if the LENIENCY-LR coecient is positive, I test
the hypotheses:
H0 : LEN LR  0 versus H1 : LEN LR > 0
where LEN LR denotes the coecient of LENIENCY-LR.
5. Empirical Evidence
5.1. Duration of Cartel Dissolution
 Graphical analysis. Figure 1 plots the semi-annual average (log-transformed) duration
of detected cartels. Scales are log-transformed to reduce the eect of outliers. The vertical bar
represents the introduction of the new leniency on February 19, 2002. DURATION averages 87
months in the 32 six-month periods preceding the new leniency. The average DURATION in
the rst eight periods immediately following leniency introduction| 121 months| is markedly
higher. The remaining six periods average 97 months, about 28 percent lower than the rst
eight periods. The average duration in the second half of 1991 should be regarded as an extreme
outlier rather than the norm: Only one cartel dissolved during that period; Moreover, in 68 out
of the 93 cartels that dissolved before February 19, 2002, DURATION is below 100 months.
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Figure 2. The Short-Run Impacts of The EC's 2002 Leniency
Notes: The sample consists of 70 EC cartels that formed before July 18, 1996. The smooth line corresponds to
cartels that dissolved before July 18, 1996. The squared line corresponds to cartels that dissolved after Februa-
ry 19, 2002.
Next, I graph the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier hazard functions. The empirical hazard
is the fraction of undissolved cartels at the start of a month which dissolves in that month.19
Using cartels born prior to July 18, 1996 but excluding cartels dissolved under the old leniency,
these functions plot rates of cartel dissolution against the cartel durations. Figure 2 depicts the
short-run movements of the empirical hazards following the introduction of the new leniency.
The squared line (resp. smooth line) corresponds the short-run (resp. long-run) hazard prole
under the new leniency (resp. absent leniency). As shown, the introduction of the new leniency
immediately results in a hazard prole with lower probabilities of dissolution. This pattern
becomes more pronounced as time elapses. Result 1 of the theoretical model suggests that such
a change is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities.
At face value, the graphical analyses suggest that the short-run eect of the leniency pre-
dicted by Harrington and Chang's theory may be a reasonable approximation to actual impact.
However, there is a reason to doubt this conclusion: The graphic analyses do not isolate the
eects of leniency from those of changes in the economic and institutional environment that
took place at roughly the same time. For example, the level of nes has increased steeply after
2002 (Russo et al. 2010).20 The next section will explore these empirical issues more rigorously.
Finally, notice that changes in the empirical hazards are hardly monotonic over time: Fol-
lowing an initial temporary rise, the long-run hazards absent leniency quickly fall. Then the
hazards recover around year 12 and nally exceed initial levels. Temporarily putting aside the
19Formally, dening the risk set in month m, Rm, as the number of cartels not dissolved by the start of month
m, and the number of break-ups in month m as Sm, the Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard is dened as Sm=Rm.
20Russo et al. show that both the average nes per infringement and the total nes have increased sharply
after 2002. See Russo et al. (2010), p. 20.
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empirical issue of whether these conicting movements are due to random data outcomes or
real economic forces, this graphic analysis suggests that a monotonic base-line hazard imposed
by a Weibull specication, such as that in Brenner (2009), may not be suited to capture these
movements.
 Regression analysis. Table 4 reports the Weibull (specication (1)) and Cox (specica-
tions (2) and (3)) regression estimates of the coecients on the explanatory variables.21 Our
focus here is on the eects of leniency. The interpretation of the coecients of the other factors
will either be discussed very briey or omitted here.
The regression analysis is performed in two steps. In the rst, I run regressions on the
complete EU sample and make the hazard rate a function of the antitrust policies and the
economic conditions discussed in the previous sections. The impacts of leniency are estimated
in the existing (in terms of model specication) framework within which the short- and long-
run impacts are not isolated (in the sense of Harrington and Chang (2009)). The coecient
of LENIENCY-SR here is the average impact in the short and the long run on the hazard of
introducing a leniency program. The purpose of this step is to show that a lack of account for
the time-varying impacts of leniency could lead to a lack of empirical support for the ecacy
of the policy.
In the second step (specication (3)), I use the same set of explanatory variables as in the
previous specications. But I exclude cartels that are born after the leniency introductions. As
mentioned in the introduction, this enables me to isolate the short-run impact of the imple-
mentation of the leniency programs from the eects associated with the long-run adjustment
process of cartel durations. The coecient of LENIENCY-SR in this specication is the short-
run impact on the hazard of introducing leniency. If a statistically signicant impact is found
with this modication, then we can conclude that the rejection of signicant policy eects in
the rst step was in fact due to the estimation biases stemming from a lack of isolation of
long-run intervention eects.
For the regressions run on the complete EU sample, reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table
4, the coecients of EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR (The coecients are  1:047 and  1:076 for
specications (1) and (2), respectively.) are statistically insignicant, suggesting that the EC's
new amnesty may have failed to destabilize and deter cartels. These results, largely resembling
21The continuous variables are in terms of natural logs so that the coecients in the equation equals the
duration elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to the independent variables. In addition, I add one to all
values before taking natural logs because some observations report zero values.
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Table 4. Hazard Model Estimates
Log(DURATION)
Specication (1) (2) (3)
Complete EU Sample Pre-Leniency EU Sample
EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR  1:047  1:076  3:560
(1:058) (1:144) (1:084)
EC's 1996 LENIENCY-SR  0:301  0:417  1:026
(0:565) (0:632) (0:605)
Log(FINES) 0:042 0:023 0:009
(0:078) (0:097) (0:106)
Log(INTEREST)  0:281  0:255  1:168
(0:882) (0:942) (0:977)
Log(GDP)  1:747  1:824  2:244
(0:690) (0:736) (0:729)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH)  0:095  0:090  0:018
(0:423) (0:429) (0:532)
Log(POS-SHOCK) 0:189 0:202 0:257
(0:123) (0:139) (0:186)
Log(NEG-SHOCK) 0:224 0:238 0:307
(0:121) (0:141) (0:195)
FIRMS  0:432  0:455  0:508
(0:132) (0:144) (0:158)
Food, feed, tobacco & other agr. products  1:154  1:003  2:149
(0:772) (0:757) (0:718)
Primary material  1:649  1:695  1:909
(0:708) (0:743) (0:960)
Chemicals  1:436  1:413  1:956
(0:736) (0:746) (0:837)
Machinery, equipment & metal products  1:997  2:008  3:418
(0:828) (0:844) (0:909)
Transport  3:066  3:035  3:649
(1:058) (1:138) (1:285)
Other products & services  2:080  2:030  2:261
(0:867) (0:948) (0:994)
Multinational 0:421 0:501 0:291
(0:650) (0:757) (0:988)
EU-wide or EEA-wide 0:250 0:315  0:073
(0:559) (0:656) (0:786)
Worldwide 0:192 0:227  0:489
(0:796) (0:907) (1:064)
Constant  4:665
(3:879)
Nonparametric baseline no yes yes
Sample size 126 126 106
Number of failures 68 68 55
Time at risk 531.85 531.85 461.49
Log-pseudolikelihood -37.77 -254.41 -186.67
Note.{ Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are shown in parentheses. Omitted LENIENCY-SR category
is \no leniency". Omitted industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market scope category is \national"
cartels. The source for these values is author's calculations based on 126 cartel decisions by the EC between December 1985
and December 2011. *** signicant at 1 percent level. ** signicant at 5 percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level.
JUN ZHOU Evaluating Leniency 23
those of Brenner's (2009) and De's (2010) models, deserve scrutiny. One limitation of specica-
tions (1) and (2) is that leniency programs, to the extent they have any impact, are constrained
to generate time-average shifts in the log-hazard functions. But the theory (Results 1 and 2)
suggests that eective antitrust innovations shift the hazard prole in opposite directions as
time elapses. Therefore, deviations in hazard rate from pre-innovation levels may not be found
when the movements are averaged out across time. Specication (3) isolates the long-run move-
ments of hazards by restricting to cartels that are born prior to July 18, 1996. Harrington and
Chang's model predicts that the time path of the hazard function shifts downwards immediately
following the introduction of a more aggressive detection and conviction policy. The coecient
of EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR in specication (3) is consistent with this proposition: The in-
troduction of the new leniency immediately results in a hazard prole with a probability of
dissolution that is approximately 34 times (expf3:56g  1  34:16) lower than the pre-leniency
levels. The eect is statistically signicant and greater in absolute value than the corresponding
estimates from specications (1) and (2). I interpret the negative coecient as evidence that
the new leniency enhanced the EC's detection capabilities. There is a similar pattern associ-
ated with the impact of the old leniency where the coecient of EC's 1996 LENIENCY-SR
in specication (3) is negative, statistically signicant and larger in absolute value than the
corresponding estimates from specications (1) and (2).
Received theory suggests that collusion becomes harder to sustain with increases in penalties
and decrease in rms' patience. The signs of the coecients are generally consistent with these
propositions. The coecient of my measure of the severity of penalties| FINES| is positive in
specication (3). The coecient of my measure of rms' patience| INTEREST| is negative.
However, these eects are not statistically signicant.
Turning to the measures of (anticipated) market demand uctuations, the coecient of
GDP is signicantly negative in specication (3). This means that when the market is
experiencing a demand growth, as represented by an increase in GDP, the probability of
dissolution is reduced. The result provides some support for the oligopoly theory which suggests
that cartel stability is tied to business cycle timing. For stance, Haltiwanger and Harrington
(1991) show that collusion becomes more dicult to sustain during recession when strong
demand today signals strong demand tomorrow. An alternative explanation to the results
above is that antitrust enforcement activity is countercyclical (Ghosal and Gallo 2001). Other
demand uctuation variables, however, do not exhibit a similarly large and signicant impact
on cartel stability.
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Finally, the signicantly negative coecient of FIRMS| my (inverse) measure of market
concentration| is at odds with a number of earlier theoretical (e.g., Selten 1973) and empirical
ndings (e.g., Porter 1985; Vasconcelos 2004), and there are at least two explanations: The
rst is that concentrated industries invite closer scrutiny from an authority and increase the
likelihood of detection (Levenstein and Suslow 2011). Second, a larger cartel membership,
followed by wider industry coverage, enhances a cartel's ability to pool information within its
membership and therefore improves the accuracy and cost eectiveness of cartel monitoring
and detecting cheating on collusive agreements (Stigler 1964).
6. Robustness Checks
In this section I briey describe exercises that I conducted to see if the results above are robust
to my empirical modeling assumptions. Seven robustness concerns are addressed. They relate
to (1) alternative measure of cartel duration, (2) confounding inuences of the DOJ's antitrust
interventions, (3) anticipation eect, (4) placebo interventions, (5) potentially time-dependent
eects of penalties and economic conditions, (6) eects of the nature of infringement and cartels'
organizational features, and (7) cross-sectional variations from the US DOJ data.
6.1. Alternative Cartel Duration Measure
An antitrust authority may not want to jeopardize its case by aiming to prove what it thinks
is the correct start date. Instead, it may aim for an outcome that inicts adequate punishment
and results in a conviction.22 Therefore, the authority may not pursue an aggressive strategy
with regards to proving long cartel duration. As a rst robustness check, I test whether my
results are robust to alternative measure of cartel duration. I rerun the specication in the
third column of Table 4 but measure the speed of cartel dissolution by DURATION-2| the
lengths of cartels' lifetime that are suspected by the EC but not necessarily with supporting
document evidence. The coecients in the rst column of Table 5 (specication (4)) show that
my results are robust to alternative denition of cartel duration.
6.2. Confounding Inuences of the DOJ's Antitrust Interventions
Twenty cartels in the pre-leniency EU sample operated not only in European but also in
American markets. They are subject to American antitrust law rules and, obviously, their
durations are likely to be aected by the DOJ's enforcement programs (e.g., the DOJ's 1993
22This point is due to the insightful comment of George Deltas.
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Table 5. Robustness Checks (Suspected duration; DOJ's inuence; anticipation eect; time-varying duration elasticities)
Log(DURATION-2) Log(DURATION)
Specication (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pre-Leniency Pre-Leniency Pre-Leniency Pre-Leniency EU Sample
EU Sample-2a EU Sample-3b EU Sample (BL) (TD)
EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR  3:842  3:330  3:012  4:003
(1:043) (1:635) (1:166) (1:205)
EC's 1996 LENIENCY-SR  1:129  0:585  0:960  1:268
(0:604) (1:052) (0:617) (0:656)
Log(FINES) 0:003 0:244  0:002  0:945 0:226
(0:107) (0:212) (0:107) (0:654) (0:151)
Log(INTEREST)  1:483  0:049  0:941 0:828  0:506
(0:860) (1:186) (1:036) (1:903) (0:453)
Log(GDP)  2:674  2:376  2:148  4:169 0:514
(0:754) (0:764) (0:798) (2:013) (0:482)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH)  0:009 0:541 0:027  1:152 0:315
(0:557) (0:874) (0:511) (2:786) (0:651)
Log(POS-SHOCK) 0:292 0:270 0:232 0:370  0:010
(0:201) (0:205) (0:184) (0:655) (0:137)
Log(NEG-SHOCK) 0:343 0:372 0:274 0:147 0:053
(0:214) (0:235) (0:186) (0:595) (0:124)
Log(FIRMS)  0:549  0:534  0:488  0:582
(0:161) (0:188) (0:158) (0:157)
Food, feed, tobacco & other  2:201  2:216  1:979  2:731
agr. products (0:691) (1:011) (0:760) (0:671)
Primary material  1:905  1:988  1:892  2:280
(0:902) (0:985) (0:917) (0:957)
Chemicals  2:180  1:879  1:763  2:423
(0:812) (0:953) (0:850) (0:939)
Machinery, equipment & metal  3:586  3:769  3:272  3:869
products (0:845) (1:189) (0:908) (0:943)
Transport  4:301  4:339  3:560  4:118
(1:250) (1:800) (1:283) (1:257)
Other products & services  2:936  2:660  2:228  3:120
(1:022) (1:300) (0:987) (1:263)
Multinational 0:154 0:931 0:368 0:381
(0:910) (1:040) (0:972) (0:855)
EU-wide or EEA-wide  0:011  0:054 0:053  0:152
(0:771) (0:869) (0:762) (0:824)
Worldwide  0:476  1:671  0:280  0:583
(1:048) (1:097) (1:085) (1:095)
Sample size 107 88 106 106
Number of failures 55 37 55 55
Time at risk 474.48 384.58 461.49 461.49
Log-pseudolikelihood -183.91 -118.40 -188.32 -179.74
Note.{ Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are shown in parentheses. Omitted LENIENCY-SR category is \no
leniency". Omitted industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". The source for these values is author's calculations based on
126 cartel decisions by the EC between December 1985 and December 2011. *** signicant at 1 percent level. ** signicant at 5
percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level. Omitted market scope category is \national" cartels.
a The sample consists of cartels that started prior to July 18, 1996 according to suspected start dates.
b The sample consists of cartels that started prior to July 18, 1996 according to proven start dates but excludes cartels that operated
in US markets.
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Leniency Program) and eorts. To isolate the potentially confounding inuences of the US
antitrust interventions, I rerun the specication in the third column of Table 4 but exclude
cartels that operated in American markets. The coecient of EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR in
column 2 of Table 5 documents that my main conclusion is robust to isolating this subsample.
6.3. Did Cartels Anticipate the New Leniency Program?
The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that cartels did not anticipate the introduction
of the new leniency. But an interesting feature of the data is that the durations actually
spike prior to the introduction of the new leniency and one may naturally relate the spike
to an anticipation eect. Indeed, it sometimes takes a considerable length of time before an
EU legislation (e.g., the EC 's 2002 leniency) is adopted. During that time, through a public
consultation and other deliberations, it was known to the interested parties that a policy change
is likely on the way. Cartels might therefore have been paying attention to and reacted upon
the potential leniency introduction before the EC formally adopts the leniency.
Figure 3 shows that my main ndings are robust to the dierent treatments of particular
pre-leniency periods. The dashed lines in Panels A, B, C and D alternately corresponds to the
Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates when the new leniency were introduced 6, 12, 18 and 24 months
sooner. The solid lines correspond to the estimated long-run hazard prole absent leniency. In
each case, the predicated hazards after leniency fall below the pre-leniency levels. Therefore,
to the extent that cartels anticipated the leniency introduction, the anticipated policy change
immediately resulted in a hazard prole with lower probabilities of dissolution (consistent with
enhanced detection).
As a more rigorous robustness check, I redene LENIENCY-SR as if the EC's 2002 le-
niency program were introduced six months sooner (i.e., on August 19, 2001). Then I regress
DURATION on the new LENIENCY-SR variable along with the other explanatory variables
in column 3 of Table 4. The resulting coecient (-3.012) is negative, large in absolute value
and again statistically signicant at the 1 percent level (specication (6), column 3 of Table
5). Redening LENIENCY-SR as if the new leniency were introduced 12 months sooner yields
similarly large and signicant coecient for the eect of the leniency (as Table 8 in my on-
line Appendix reports). Overall, therefore, the results lend statistical support for enhanced
detection capabilities due to the introduction of the new leniency.23
23Alternatively, one might expect rms to delay their leniency applications until at least some time has elapsed
since the introduction of the new leniency program. The empirical evidence cuts against this story. As early
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Figure 3. Short-Run Impact of the EC's 2002 Leniency when Cartels Anticipate the Leniency
Introduction, Robustness Checks
Notes: The samples in panels A, B,C and D consists of 71, 74, 76 and 78 EC cartels that formed before July 18, 1996, respectively.
The smooth lines in Panels A, B, C and D correspond to cartels that dissolved before July 18, 1996. The dashed lines in panels
A, B, C and D alternately correspond to cartels that dissolved after August 19, 2001, February 19, 2001, August 19, 2000 and
February 19, 2000.
6.4. Leniency Programs versus Placebo Policies
My empirical model imposes two exogenous breakpoints at the dates of leniency introduction|
July 18, 1996 and February 19, 2002. If alternative breakpoints| i.e., placebo policies| provide
a better t to the data, then one could argue that the relationship between leniency introduction
and the time series of detected cartels is unlikely to be causal and that my results are driven by
as on 19 February 2002, the EC received an application for leniency from Deltana S.p.A. under the terms of
the revised leniency. Moreover, the EC received leniency applications in more than 20 cases during the rst
year of the revised program, relative to only 16 cases during the previous 6 years combined (van Barlingen
2003; van Barlingen and Barennes 2005). Moreover, to the extent that rms delayed leniency applications, the
average durations of discovered cartels that formed absent leniency but failed immediately prior to and after the
introduction of the new leniency should be low (as opposed to the more gradual fall long after the introduction
implied by the theoretical model). This fails to hold in the data: The average durations of discovered cartels
that formed absent leniency but failed immediately prior to and after the leniency introduction are high.
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Figure 4. The EC's 2002 Leniency Program versus Placebo Interventions
Notes: Each point represents the maximized-likelihood of a Cox regression. The point located at zero at the horizontal axe is
produced by breakpoints that correspond to the introduction of the EC's 2002 Leniency. The points to the left (resp. right) of zero
are produced by placebo interventions that predates (resp. postdates) the introduction of the EC's 2002 Leniency.
misspecication. To see if this is the case, I re-run the regression model in column 3 of Table 4
but use alternative breakpoints in the data and compare the maximized log-likelihoods across
the regressions.
Figures 4 depicts the results. Each point on the graphs represents the maximized log-
likelihood of one regression specication. The point located at zero on the horizontal axes marks
the maximized log-likelihood when the breakpoints are chosen at the leniency introductions.
The points to the left (resp. right) of zero represent the log-likelihoods produced when the
breakpoints are chosen before (resp. after) the introduction of the EC's 2002 leniency. Panel A
uses six-month periods. As shown, the maximized log-likelihood produced by leniency (-186.67)
is greater than those produced by all but one placebo intervention that immediately follows the
leniency introduction. The single oending placebo intervention corresponds to a sharp increase
in DURATION of one cartel that dissolved in the rst period after the leniency introduction.
Panels B and C show that the results are similar when three-month and twelve-month periods
are used. In the twelve-month case, the regression t is globally maximal when the breakpoint
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is imposed at leniency introduction.
In Figure 5 of the online Appendix, I plot the log-likelihoods produced by breakpoints that
are chosen before and after the introduction of the EC's 1996 leniency. The maximized log-
likelihood produced by the old leniency is greater than those produced by all but one of the
placebo interventions. Overall, the robustness check provides some support for the empirical
specication.
6.5. Time-Varying Eects of Fines and Economic Conditions
To this point, my discussion of Cox models is fairly standard. Most applications make the initial
hazard rate a function of explanatory variables and estimate a single duration elasticity. Earlier
theory (e.g., Harrington 2004) and empirical evidence (Suslow 2005) suggest, however, that the
impacts on cartel behavior of changes in institutional and economic environment may not be
constant over time. Consequently, I generalize the usual proportional hazard specication
by allowing the duration elasticity of each observation to vary with a vector of explanatory
variables. The model being estimated now takes the form of hi(t; xi) = h0(t) exp(x
0
i(t)) where
hi(t;xi) is the hazard rate at time t for case i with covariates xi. Following Stablein et al.
(1981), I assume that (t) is a vector of linear functions of time. This is equivalent to adding
an interaction term of x and time to the model, which was proposed by Cox (1972) to check
the assumption of proportional hazards for the covariates. In the absence of ties (i.e., multiple
cartel groups collapse at the same tj) the full partial log-likelihood is given by
lnL =
X
j; j=0
x0j(tj) +
X
j; j=1

~0 + x
0
j(tj)

 
X
j
ln
24X
2Rj

exp (x0(tj)) + exp

~0 + x
0
(tj)
35 ;
where, as before,  = 0 (resp.  = 1) indicates those cartels collapsed in a natural death (resp.
an antitrust intervention). ~0 is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for dierent
types of cartel dissolution dier by a constant ratio.
The generalized model reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 (specication (7)) allows
variation in penalties and macroeconomic conditions to change both the slope and intercept of
the relationship between the log-hazard function and the log of current duration. The coe-
cients reported under the heading \TD" (abbreviation for \time-dependence") gauge the eect
of changes in penalties and economic environments on the slope, or duration elasticity, of this
relationship. The coecients reported under the heading \BL" (abbreviation for \baseline")
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generate parallel shifts in the log-hazard function. As shown, the generalization has no qualita-
tive eect on my main result: The average duration of detected cartels increases immediately
after the introduction of the new leniency.
6.6. Nature of Infringement and Cartel's Organizational Features
The hazard function reported in Table 6 (specication (8)) controls for types of infringement and
cartel's organizational features as covariates. While some of the studies cited in the introduction
include these variables, it may be argued that they are endogenous variables. The main point
to extract from my analysis here is the robustness of the empirical regularities that following
the introduction of the new leniency, the average duration of discovered cartels increases in the
short run.
6.7. Evidence from The United States
The US DOJ's 1993 Leniency Program (August 10, 1993) facilitates further empirical eval-
uations of leniency. The EC's 2002 Leniency Notice, with its guarantee for full immunity for
qualifying rst-in applicants, aligns the EC's policy with that of the DOJ. In addition, the EC's
new leniency| like the present US policy| replaced a regime in which immunity grants were
discretionary. One could therefore apply the methods outlined in Sections 2 and 4 to gauge the
impact of the 1993 Leniency Program on the ability of the DOJ to detect and deter cartels.
To this end, I use a subsample of Miller (2009)'s DOJ data and additional variables. By
grouping the cartelists, Miller identies a total of 342 distinct cartels from 809 information
reports and 222 indictments. My analysis uses 334 cartels for which information on the ap-
proximate start and end dates of the conspiracy is available. A subsample of the DOJ data|
294 cartels| are formed before the introduction of the DOJ's new leniency. They are referred
to as the pre-leniency DOJ sample. 86 cartels dissolved after the leniency introduction. I refer
to them as the post-leniency DOJ sample.
 Descriptive statistics of cartel duration. In the online Appendix, I have a table (Table
9) that provides an overview for the average durations of the DOJ detected cartels by their start
and end dates. The table shows that in the pre-leniency DOJ sample, the average duration
of cartels that failed in the period preceding August 10, 1993 is markedly lower than that of
cartels that failed after the leniency revision; Moreover, in the post-leniency DOJ sample, the
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Table 6: Robustness Checks (Nature of Infringement and Cartel's Organizational Features)
Specication (8)
Log(DURATION) Log(DURATION)
EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR  4:027 EU-wide or EEA-wide  0:434
(1:674) (1:096)
EC's 1996 LENIENCY-SR  0:987 Worldwide  1:464
(0:806) (1:672)
Log(FINES) 0:078 PRICE FIXING  0:347
(0:122) (1:116)
Log(INTEREST)  0:795 MARKET SHARING 0:242
(1:203) (1:038)
Log(GDP)  2:392 BID RIGGING  0:852
(1:011) (0:634)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH)  0:423 MONITORING  0:730
(0:666) (0:816)
Log(POS-SHOCK) 0:259 RETALIATION 1:573
(0:287) (0:666)
Log(NEG-SHOCK) 0:340 PRICE LEADER 0:062
(0:271) (0:515)
Log(FIRMS)  0:734 SIDE ARRANGEMENT  0:080
(0:296) (0:607)
Food, feed, tobacco & other agr. products  4:653 COMPENSATION  0:002
(1:785) (0:561)
Primary material  4:114 THREAT 0:385
(1:709) (0:969)
Chemicals  2:963 RINGLEADER  1:519
(1:412) (0:638)
Machinery, equipment & metal products  4:852 RECIDIVISM  0:233
(1:586) (0:696)
Transport  3:754
(2:083)
Other products & services  2:722 Sample size 104
(1:629) Number of failures 54
Multinational  0:405 Time at risk 451.10
(1:403) Log-pseudolikelihood -169.91
Note.{ Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are shown in parentheses. Omitted LENIENCY-SR category is
\no leniency". Omitted industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market scope category is \national" cartels.
PRICE FIXING=1 if any two members of a cartel agreed to x prices or the rate of price increases or minimum prices, or to
x discounts and rebates, or to x sales quota; 0 otherwise. MARKET SHARING=1 if any two members of a cartel agreed
to allocate specic customers or types of customers, products, or territories among themselves; 0 otherwise. BID RIGGIN=1 if
any two members of a cartel agreed to raise prices where purchasers acquired goods or services by soliciting competing bids; 0
otherwise. COMPNESATION=1 if members agreed on a compensation scheme; 0 otherwise. THREAT=1 if threat or coercion
were used to induce participation in or compliance with an infringement; 0 otherwise. MONITORING=1 if sales information was
exchanged for monitoring purpose; 0 otherwise. RETALIATION=1 if members agreed on retaliatory mechanisms; 0 otherwise.
PRICE LEADER=1 if a member took the role of a price or market leader; 0 otherwise. SIDE ARRANGEMENT=1 if members
had side arrangements (e.g., joint investment, technology sharing, exchange of product, etc.); 0 otherwise. RINGLEADER=1
the EC identied a ringleader; 0 otherwise. RECIDIVISM=0 if all members are rst-time oenders; 1 if a member is a recidivist.
The source for these values is author's calculations based on 104 cartel decisions by the EC between 1990 and April 2011.
*** signicant at 1 percent level. ** signicant at 5 percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level.
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average duration of cartels that formed prior to the leniency revision is higher than that of
cartels formed after the revision.
 Graphical analysis. The gure (Figure 6) that I present in the online Appendix plots the
semi-annual average duration of detected cartels. The gure shows that the average duration of
cartels that dissolved in the rst eight periods immediately following the leniency introduction is
markedly higher than that of cartels that formed and failed before the policy change; Moreover,
the average duration long after leniency revision is lower than that of the rst eight periods
after the policy change.
Taking together and evaluated within the framework of the theoretical model, the descrip-
tive statistics and the graphical analysis suggest that the increase in average duration in the
short run around leniency revision is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities; and that
the subsequent readjustment below short-run levels is consistent with enhanced deterrence ca-
pabilities.
 Regression analysis. I run two regressions: First, I consider the short-run eects of
leniency. I rerun the model in column 3 of Table 4 on the sample of DOJ cartels that started
before the introduction of the DOJ's new leniency and use additional variables. The variable
DOJ LENIENCY-SR divides the pre-leniency DOJ sample into two groups: one consisting of
cartels dissolved before the leniency introduction and the other of cartels dissolved after the
leniency introduction. The coecient of DOJ LENIENCY-SR is the short run eect of leniency
on the hazard. Estimates of the coecients are presented in columns 1 Table 7.24 It turns out
that while the magnitudes of the eects of the antitrust policies vary, the main result of the
previous sections holds: The estimated DOJ LENIENCY-SR coecient of  0:486 corresponds
to an immediate 63 percent (expf0:486g   1  0:63) decrease in dissolution hazard and is
statistically signicant, consistent with enhanced detection.
Next, I consider the long-run eects of leniency. Column 2 of Table 7 shows that the re-
gression results from the sub-sample of 86 cartels that dissolved after the leniency introduction.
The variable DOJ LENIENCY-LR divides the sub-sample into two groups: one consisting of
cartels started before the leniency introduction and the other of cartels started after the leniency
introduction. The coecient of DOJ LENIENCY-LR is the dierence between the short- and
long-run eects of leniency on the hazard. The estimated DOJ LENIENCY-LR coecient is
positive and statistically signicant, and corresponds to a 9.11 times (expf2:314g   1  9:11)
24For brevity, the industry xed eect coecients are postponed to in the online Appendix.
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Table 7. Cox Regression Parameter Estimates of The DOJ Cartel Sample
Log(DURATION-3)
Specication (9) (10)
Pre-Leniency DOJ Sample Post-Leniency DOJ Sample
DOJ LENIENCY-SR  0:486
(0:260)
DOJ LENIENCY-LR 2:314
(0:375)
Log(FINES-2)  0:473  0:298
(0:133) (0:169)
Log(FIRMS)  0:428  0:104
(0:093) (0:180)
Log(INTEREST-2)  0:323 1:221
(0:281) (0:533)
Log(GDP) 0:011  0:890
(0:211) (1:018)
PEAK-TROUGH 0:054  0:472
(0:287) (1:584)
Log(POS-SHOCK) 0:059 0:059
(0:101) (0:118)
Log(NEG-SHOCK) 0:053 0:010
(0:103) (0:146)
Regional 0:563  0:118
(0:165) (0:410)
National 0:211  0:707
(0:212) (0:530)
International 0:770  0:418
(0:331) (0:560)
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes
Sample size 294 86
Number of failures 277 83
Time at risk 1,040.06 318.82
Log-likelihood -1,270.67 -262.85
Note.{ Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are shown in parentheses. DURATION-3 is the
number of months between a cartel's start and end dates that were plea-bargained. DOJ LENIENCY-SR equals
one if a cartel dissolves in the period postdates August 10, 1993, and zero otherwise. DOJ LENIENCY-LR
equals one if a cartel starts in the period postdates August 10, 1993, and zero otherwise. FINES-2 is the total
corporate nes issued by the US DOJ during the previous scal year in 2005 dollars. INTEREST-2 is the annual
average three month T-bill rate. Omitted geographic scope category is \local cartels". \Industry xed eect"
is a categorical variable indicating the type of industry where a cartel operates. The source for these values is
author's calculations based on 334 cartel decisions by the US DOJ for the years 1985-2005. *** signicant at 1
percent level. ** signicant at 5 percent level. * signicant at 10 percent level.
increase in the dissolution hazard from the short-run levels. I interpret the result as evidence
that the new leniency enhanced the DOJ's deterrence capabilities.
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7. Conclusion
The social costs of cartel have motivated an extensive literature investigating the ecacy and
design of anti-cartel policies. However, due to their illegal nature, cartels conceal their activities
and one observes only discovered cartels. Because the discovered cartels might be a small and
characteristically unrepresentative sample of the population of cartels, one cannot infer the
ecacy of an antitrust-innovation on the population of cartels based on information gleaned
from the discovered cartels without additional assumptions being made that may or may not
be correct. This article takes one step to address the problem.
I adapt a model developed by Harrington and Chang (2009) where an industry of rms
interact repeatedly over an innite time horizon. An ecacious antitrust innovation increases
a rm's short-run gains from unilateral deviation to a level that exceeds its long-run gains from
colluding. In this way, some cartels would have been sustainable and long-lived in absence
of the policy becomes unstable and shorter-lived. The model predicts that in the short-run,
a more aggressive detection and conviction policy increases the average duration of detected
cartels due to enhanced detection; In the long run, the average duration observed decreases due
to enhanced deterrence.
Using data on discovered and prosecuted cartels from the EC, I estimate the inuence of
the EC's new corporate leniency program on the timing of cartel dissolution. My empirical
work is the rst that shows that, consistent with the theory, the duration of discovered cartels
increases immediately following the introduction of a more ecacious leniency program and
then falls below short-run levels.
Future empirical work should comprehensively address the issue of causality between le-
niency and cartel duration. This paper emphasizes the eect of leniency on duration, but there
may be simultaneity: for example, it is sometimes thought that the origins of enhancements
in the EC's detection and deterrence capabilities came from the US. The implementation of
the DOJ's leniency programs in 1978 and 1993 followed an better understanding, in the US
as well as in other jurisdictions, of cartel damages and duration. Similar policy innovations in
the EU might have been triggered, at least partly, by such enhanced understanding. Though
my analysis of the DOJ's leniency is free of the aforementioned endogeneity problem, a more
rigorous empirical analysis to determine causality should be performed, ideally by having an
instrumental variable for the EC's leniency introduction. Nevertheless, the analysis using the
DOJ data nds that leniency has a causal impact on cartel duration, in line with the theory
and my analysis of the EC time series of cartel duration.
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My regression samples are essentially two time series with three policy changes. Cross-
sectional variation could provide more robust identication, and the recent introduction of
leniency programs by antitrust authorities at individual European member states may provide
this variation in future research. Moreover, some cartels may have been discovered at member
state level even though their operation may have been wider. The EC's leniency programs could
well have an inuence on these cartels although they have so far escaped the EC. Nevertheless,
insofar as the eect of leniency| my main results| is concerned, the validity of the parameter
estimates does not require that the regression sample include undetected cartels.
On balance, the evidence in favor Harrington and Chang's theory is strong. Harrington
and Chang's dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution does provide a simple but
theoretically consistent way of analyzing cartel duration determinants, and it does receive
some empirical support. My interpretation is that it is a promising way of bringing some
understanding to the empirical regularities in this complex area.
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